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THE SOUND OF SILENCE: 
THE LEGALITY OF THE AMERICAN 
"KILL SWITCH" BILL 
Deborah Beth Medows 
In today's culture, many of our daily interactions depend on the 
Internet. Internet connectivity empowers us to engage in commerce, 
contact faraway relatives, or even find a future spouse. This begs the 
question: To what extent can the government of the United States 
deny a citizen's Internet access, and under what legal framework is 
the effective silencing of the Internet lawful? 
This Article explores the technicalities of how Internet censorship 
works. It then provides a basic introduction to cyberattacks and the 
types of dangers that such attacks pose. Then, it discusses the 
framework of the "kill switch" phenomenon by citing examples of 
governments that have interfered with their inhabitants' Internet 
connectivity. Finally, this Article evaluates the legality of pending 
kill switch legislation in the United States under the scope of the 
President's executive powers and the First Amendment's free speech 
protections. 
I. lNTRANATIONAL SILENCING 
A. How Intranational Censorship Technically Works 
A government's ability to disconnect a country's Internet usage is 
widely known by the pejorative term "kill switch."1 In actuality, the 
term is a misnomer. It is unrealistic to envision that governmental 
authorities could employ a physical switch to disconnect computers 
from the Internet.2 Instead, governmental officials would need to 
contact Internet Service Providers (ISPs), who would then authorize 
1. See Bianca Bosker, Internet "Kill Switch" Would Give President Power 
to Shut Down The Web, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 17, 2010, 4:20 PM, 
updated May 25, 2011, 5:50 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/17 /internet-kill-switch-
woul_n_615923.html (describing the proposed Protecting Cyberspace as 
a National Asset Act, which, if passed, would allow the "president the 
authority 'to seize control of or even shut down portions of the 
Internet.'"). 
2. E.g. David Knowles, Internet Kill Switch: Should the United States 
Emulate Egypt?, AOL NEWS (Jan. 28, 2011, 2:46 PM), 
http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/28/internet-kill-switch-should-the-
united-states-emulate-egypt/ ("What is most likely is that somebody in 
the government gives a phone call to a small number of people and says, 
'Turn it off."'). 
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their engineers to change the configuration of the Internet traffic flow 
to stop service to the populace.3 As a result of the governmental 
action, that portion of the population which previously could connect 
to the Internet would no longer be able to do so. 4 
B. The Need for Intragovernmental ''Kill Switches" in the Age of 
Cyberattacks 
Governments, including that of the United States, may need to 
disconnect computers from the Internet to counteract the effects of or 
' to prevent, a cyberattack.5 This necessity is realistic because this 
form of attack is not brand-new; there are several notable instances of 
wide-scale cyberattacks.6 In 1982, the United States allegedly 
attacked the Siberian pipeline by placing a logic bomb into software 
which caused an explosion. 7 Iran blamed Israel and the United State~ 
for planting the Stuxnet worm, which was capable of seizing control 
of industrial plants, in Iran's nuclear facilities. 8 The cyberattack 
eliminated approximately twenty percent of the facility's nuclear 
centrifuges.9 In 2007, a cyberattack in Brazil that was propagated for 
unclear motives, distressed millions of Brazilians and cost the country 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Id. ("And then· one engineer at each service provider logs into the 
equipment and changes the configuration of how traffic should flow."). 
Id. (describing how a "kill switch" would allow the government to 
disconned a portion of society from the Internet). 
See, e.g., Amar Toor, The Internet "Kill Switch" Bill: What It Is, and 
Why It Wo~'t Die, SWITCHED (Feb. 1, 2011, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.sw1tched.com/2011/02/01/internet-kill-switch-bill-what-it-
is-wont-die/ (describing the proposed bill and how the legislation "would 
provide a mechanism for the government to work with the private sector 
in the event of a true cyber emergency."). 
See Olivia Solon, Do We Need a Geneva Convention for Cyber 
Warfare?, WIRED (Oct. 15, 2010), 
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2010-10/15/cyber-warfare-ethics 
(describing different examples of when cyber attacks have occurred, such 
as the Siberian pipeline logic bomb, and attacks in Estonia, Georgia, 
and even on Google). 
See id. ("In 1982, the U.S. reportedly sabotaged the Siberian pipeline 
through a logic bomb planted in software, causing an explosion."). 
See id.; see also Stuxnet Worm Hits Iran Nuclear Plant Staff 
Computers, BBC NEWS MIDDLE EAST (Sept. 26, 2010, 10:57 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11414483 (describing 
how the worm has infected the personal computers of staff members). 
See Jon Swartz, "Kill, Switch" Internet Bill, A"/nrms Privacy Experts, USA TODAY, 
(Feb. 15, 2011, 3:16 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2011-02-15-kill-
switch_N.htm ("The Stuxnet computer worm wiped out about 203 of 
Iran's ,nucl~~r centrifuges and helped delay, though not destroy, 
Tehran s ability to make its first nuclear arms."). 
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millions of dollars .10 Over three million people across dozens of 
Brazilian cities lost Internet connection and the world's largest iron 
ore producer, located in one of those cities, lost seven million dollars 
when the attack disconnected seven of its plants from the Internet.11 
In March of 2001, a disgruntled former employee successfully hacked 
into the Australian computerized sewage system and released millions 
of liters of waste into public waterways.12 These examples are 
alarming, and as a result of the scope of devastation made possible by 
these forms of attacks, government-perpetrated cyberattacks may 
constitute an act of warfare. 13 
Although the public may not generally be cognizant of the risks 
posed by cyberattacks, governments must be allowed to develop a 
strategy to counteract this new method of attack. Cyberattacks are 
different from conventional acts of warfare due to the speed with 
which cyberattacks devastate infrastructure,14 the perpetrator's low 
cost of creating such devastation, 15 and the obstacles that prevent law 
enforcement from learning the attacker's identities. 16 As theorist 
Herman Kahn wrote, virtual attacks are complicated because "[t]he 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
See id. (describing how the cyberattacks in Brazil caused harm to the 
country). 
Id. 
Id. 
See Dan Rivers, On the Frontline of Cyber Warfare, CNN TECH (Nov. 
4, 2010, 4:48 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010 /TECH/web /10 /28 /malaysia.cyber .security /i 
ndex.html .("In the future, warfare may shift from a battlefield to a 
keyboard. Superpowers might deem a nuclear exchange too destructive, 
but already they are developing Wea pons of Mass Disruption; software 
viruses that are designed to cripple the operating systems of power 
stations, dams, traffic lights and public transport."). 
See William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's 
Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 99 (2010) ("Cyberwarfare is like 
maneuver warfare, in that speed and agility matter most."). 
See id. at 98-99 ("The low cost of computing devices means that U.S. 
adversaries do not have to build expensive weapons ... to pose a 
significant threat to U.S. military capabilities. A dozen determined 
computer programs can ... threaten the United States' global logistics 
network, steal its operational plans, blind its intelligence capabilities, or 
hinder its ability to deliver weapons on target."). 
See Kim Zetter, Former NSA Director: Countries Spewing Cyberattacks 
Should be Held Responsible, WIRED (Jul. 29, 2010, 3:52 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07 /hayden-at-~lackhat/ . 
("Attribution is one of the biggest problems on the mternet when it 
comes to cyberwarfare. How do you hold a nation responsible for 
malicious attacks if you can't determine whether the activity was state-
sponsored? "). 
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their engineers to change the configuration of the Internet traffic flow 
to stop service to the populace. 3 As a result of the governmental 
action, that portion of the population which previously could connect 
to the Internet would no longer be able to do so.4 
B. The Need for Intragovernmental "Kill Switches" in the Age of 
Cyberattacks 
Governments, including that of the United States, may need to 
disconnect computers from the Internet to counteract the effects of or 
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form of attack is not brand-new; there are several notable instances of 
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attacked the Siberian pipeline by placing a logic bomb into software, 
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for planting the Stuxnet worm, which was capable of seizing control 
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centrifuges.9 In 2007, a cyberattack in Brazil that was propagated for 
unclear motives, distressed millions of Brazilians and cost the country 
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8. 
9. 
Id. ("And then one engineer at each service provider logs into the 
equipment and changes the configuration of how traffic should flow."). 
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in the event of a true cyber emergency."). 
See Olivia Solon, Do We Need a Geneva Convention for Cyber 
Warfare?, WIRED (Oct. 15, 2010), 
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2010-10/15/cyber-warfare-ethics 
(describing different examples of when cyber attacks have occurred, such 
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and even on Google). 
See id. ("In 1982, the U.S. reportedly sabotaged the Siberian pipeline 
through a logic bomb planted in software, causing an explosion."). 
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Computers, BBC NEWS MIDDLE EAST (Sept. 26, 2010, 10:57 AM), 
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how the worm has infected the personal computers of staff members). 
See Jon Swartz, "Kill Switch" Iniernet Bill Aln:rms Privacy Experts, USA TODAY, 
(Feb. 15, 2011, 3:16 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy /2011-02-15-kill-
switch_N.htm ("The Stuxnet computer worm wiped out about 203 of 
Iran's nuclear centrifuges and helped delay, though not destroy, 
Tehran's ability to make its first nuclear arms."). 
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millions of dollars. 10 Over three million people across dozens of 
Brazilian cities lost Internet connection and the world's largest iron 
Ore producer located in one of those cities, lost seven million dollars 
' 11 when the attack disconnected seven of its plants from the Internet. 
In March of 2001, a disgruntled former employee successfully hacked 
into the Australian computerized sewage system and released millions 
of liters of waste into public waterways.12 These examples are 
alarming, and as a result of the scope of devastation made possible by 
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Although the public may not generally be cognizant of the risks 
posed by cyberattacks, governments must be allowed to develop a 
strategy to counteract this new method of attack. Cyberattacks are 
different from conventional acts of warfare due to the speed with 
which cyberattacks devastate infrastructure, 14 the perpetrator's low 
cost of creating such devastation, 15 and the obstacles that prevent law 
enforcement from learning the attacker's identities. 16 As theorist 
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Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 99 (2010) ("Cyberwarfare is like 
maneuver warfare, in that speed and agility matter most."). 
See id. at 98-99 ("The low cost of computing devices means that U.S. 
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sponsored? "). 
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aggressor has to find only one crucial weakness; the defender has to 
find all of them, and in advance. "17 
Since cyberattacks can be incredibly dangerous, it is important to 
consider the legality of potential prophylactic measures. Some 
guidance may exist in international law. The provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions do not adequately address the modern-day issues 
posed by cyberwarfare and thus fail to serve as a relevant legal 
framework. 18 Articles 2(4) and 39 of the United Nations Charter may 
provide a lawful basis for defense of cross-border cyberattacks. 19 
Alternatively, .the international law doctrine known as the Common 
Heritage of Mankind, which is based on the right of freedom of 
expression, may protect the public from governmental interference in 
the ability to use the Internet.20 The alleged right to Internet 
connectivity may also be derived from Article 15, Paragraph 3 of the 
International Covenant on Economic,. Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICES CR), which protects the freedom of scientific research and 
creative activity, and under Articles 13 and 14, which guarantee the 
right to education. 21 
Still, international legal provisions do not answer the question of 
how the United States can protect itself from cyberattacks under 
domestic law. Over a hundred foreign intelligence organizations have 
17. Jack Goldsmith, The New Vulnerability, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jun. 7, 
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-
arts/75262/the-new-vulnerability?page=032Cl (discussing the 
applicability of Kahn's proposition to computer networks). 
18. See Patricia Donovan, Cyberwars: Already Underway with No Geneva 
Conventions to Guide Them, UNIV. OF BUFFALO NEWSCTR. (Oct. 14, 
2010), http://www.buffalo.edu/news/11862 ("But unlike conventional 
warfare, there is nothing remotely close to the Geneva Conventions for 
cyberwar. There are no boundaries in place and no protocols that set 
the standards in international law for how such wars can and cannot be 
waged."). 
19. Antonio Segura-Serrano, Internet Regulation and the Role of 
~~ternational Law, 10 MAX ~LANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 191, 221 (2006) 
( Because of the novelty of this threat ... the question arises whether 
an actual Internet attack ... might come within the terms of Arts 2 ( 4) 
and 39 of the UN Charter, triggering collective action and possibly 
allowing the right of self-defense."). 
20. Id. at 233 (describing how the Common Heritage of Mankind has been 
largely ignored by developed states, but might be applicable to Internet 
usage). 
21. Id. a~ 264 ("U~der article 15 of the ICESCR, cultural rights [grant] ... 
the nght to enJoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications . 
. . [and] parties undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for 
scientific research and creative activity. Alternatively, this right of 
access may form part of the right to education, protected by articles 13 
and 14."). 
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attempted to infiltrate American computer networks,22 demonstrating 
the need for the U.S. to prepare technological and le~al de~enses. to 
ter these attacks such as the kill switch. This Article first coun ' . . 
lores the frameworks through which other countnes have used kill exp . . . ' .. t d 
switches to disconnect thelf citizens Internet conn~ctivi y, ~n 
subsequently examines the legality of the United State implementrng 
and utilizing a kill switch. 
C. Contextual Examples 
The most noteworthy use of a kill switch occurred in the 
relatively recent watershed events in Egypt, which has been regarded 
as "unprecedented in Internet history. "23 Activists in Egypt u~ed 
social network websites, such as Twitter and Facebook, to orgamze 
protests.24 The Egyptian government a~te~pted t~ _cease activists' 
ability to communicate and to organize dissident political movements 
by barring access to specific targeted websites. 25 In its failed attem~t 
to protect its reigning government, the Egyptian government act~d rn 
a manner previously considered "unthinkable for any country with a 
major Internet economy. "26 The government contacted each of the 
country's four major ISPs, and "[a]n engineer at each ISP would then 
access the ISP's routers, which contain a list of all the IP addresses, 
thus cutting off anyone who wants to access them from within or 
outside the country. "27 The ISP connector that supports Egypt's 
stock exchange, Noor Group, continued to function, but nearly all of 
the rest of the ISPs complied with the government's order to change 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
Lynn, supra note 14 ("[M]ore than 100 foreign intelligence organizations 
are trying to break into U.S. networks. Some governments a~eady h~ve 
the capacity to disrupt elements of the U.S. mformat10n 
infrastructure."). 
The Day That Egypt Unplugged the Internet, WSJ BLOGS: DISPATCH 
(Jan. 28, 2011, 11:29 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2011/01/28/the-day-that-egypt-
unplugged-the-internet /. 
See Knowles, supra note 2 ("As was witnessed Thursday in Egypt, the 
embattled government acted to shut down the Internet as 
demonstrations fueled by social networking sites like Facebook and 
Twitter threatened to overwhelm the ruling party."). 
See id. 
The Day that Egypt Unplugged the Internet, supra note 29. 
See Paul Lilly, How Egypt's Internet Kill Switch Works, MAXIMUM PC 
(Jan. 31, 2011, 9:18 . ~M), 
http://www.maximumpc.com/article/news/how_egypts_mternet_kill_ 
switch_ works. 
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the "lines of code," and consequently disabled the majority of Egypt's 
Internet connectivity.28 
Egypt is not the only country that has disabled its inhabitants' 
ability to connect to the Internet. Nepal and Burma have both 
experienced intranational government Internet shutdowns. 29 In 
response to the Egyptian upnsmg, Chinese officials blocked 
information relating to the Egyptian revolt from its estimated four 
hundred and fifty-seven million Internet users.30 On a broader scale 
' the Chinese government completely disabled Internet connectivity in
the Xinjiang region in 2009 following dissident political activity.31 
These aforementioned international examples demonstrate that 
foreign governments have been successful, at least to a noteworthy 
degree, in disabling or limiting Internet use within their own borders. 
However, even if the United States had the ability to disable Internet 
access within its borders, it is unclear whether it would be legally able 
to do so, given the Nation's rich history of protecting free speech arid 
upholding the separation of powers. Arguably, the Internet is itself a 
distinctly American concept, built upon the "freedom of information 
and free flows of data. "32 Measures to constrict this freedom should 
be critically evaluated, even when balanced against the importance of 
safeguarding national security. 
28. See id. ("[S]ome 93 percent of Egyptian networks have been taken 
offline. There's at least one major ISP -- Noor Group -- up and running, 
the same one that hosts Egypt's stock exchange."). 
29. See Jonathan Zittrain and Molly Sauter, Will the U.S. Get an Internet 
"Kill Switch"?, TECH. REV. (Mar. 4, 2011), 
http:/ /www.technologyreview.com/web/32451/?mod=chfeatured&a=f 
(describing the brief internet shut-downs in Nepal in 2005 and Burma in 
2007). 
30. See Jeremy Page, Beijing Blocks Protest Reports, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 
2011), . . 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704832704576113810779 
590744.html ("China's state media have provided limited coverage of 
the unrest in Egypt, including the scores of reported deaths, the cutting 
of Internet and cellphone access, and President Hosni Mubarak's 
appointment of a vice president."). 
31. See id. ("Chinese authorities also stepped up their efforts to control the 
Internet after the 'color revolutions' in the former Soviet Union in 2003-
05, and the pro-democracy protests in Iran in 2009. They completely 
shut down Internet access in the northweiStern Chinese region of 
Xinjiang for several months after riots there in 2009."). 
32. Segura-Serrano, supra note 19, at 231. 
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II. THE PROPOSED "KILL SWITCH" BILL 
A. Provisions of the Bill 
In 2010 legislation was introduced in the U.S. Senate specifying 
the conditio~1s under which the government would have the ability to 
activate a kill switch.33 The proposed bill, "S.3480: Protecting 
Cyberspace as a National Asse~ Act,"34 would grant the Presi~5ent t~e power to disable the Internet m the event of an emergency. This 
bipartisan bill was co-sponsored by Senators on the Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee: Maine Senator Susan 
Collins the ranking Republican on the Committee, 36 Connecticut Indepe~dent Senator Joseph Lieberman, the Committee Chairman,37 
and Delaware Democratic Senator Tom Carper.38 
This bill, which was approved by a Senate panel, _would creat~ a 
governmental agency called the National Center for Cybersecur1ty 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
S. 3480 § 249, lllth Cong. (2010); Chloe Albanesius, Lieberman Backs 
Away From "Internet Kill Switch", PC MAG (June 21, 2010, 3:19 P~), 
http:// www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2365393,00.asp (recountmg 
that the controversy swirling around the bill "prompted many to dub 
[the] option an 'Internet kill switch'"); Jon Orlin, In Search of 
the Internet Kill Switch, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 6, 2011), 
http://techcrunch.com/2011/03/06/in-search-of-the-internet-kill-switch/ 
("It became known as the Internet 'k~l switch'. ~!11 even though the 
words 'kill' and 'switch' are not found m the bill. ); Matthew Schafer, 
How the Internet "Kill Switch" Bill Became the Bulwark of Internet 
Independence, GROUND REP. (Feb. 21, 2011), 
http://www.groundreport.com/Media_and_Tech/How-the-Internet-
Kill-Switch-Bill-Became-the-Bulwa/2934942 (noting that the bill ·was 
"subject to a maelstrom of controversy" after being dubbed 
a kill switch); see also Declan McCullagh, Senators Propose Granting 
President Emergency Internet Power, CNET NEWS (June 10, 2010, 8:25 
PM), http:// news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20007418-~8.html 
(recognizing "few limits on the presi~ent'~ emergency power, wh1ch"can 
be renewed indefinitely," and notmg mdustry concerns over the 
potential for absolute power."). 
S. 3480 § 249, lllth Cong. (2010); see Meredith Jessup, Committee 
Passes Plan for Internet "Kill Switch" in Egypt- U.S., THEBLAZE (Jan. 
29, 2011, 1:52 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/committee-passes-
plan-for-internet-kill-switch-in-egypt-u-s /. 
S. 3480 § 249; see Knowles, supra note 2 ("Championed by Sen. Joe 
Lieberman the bill would give President Barack Obama . . . control to 
snuff out 'the Internet in one fell swoop during a so-called. "cyber-
emergency[.] "). 
Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status 111th Congress 
2010) S.3480 Cosponsors (last · visited Oct. 
2012), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl l l:SN03480:@@@P. 
Id. 
{2009-
17, 
38. Id. 
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the "lines of code," and consequently disabled the majority of Egypt's 
Internet connectivity.28 
Egypt is not the only country that has disabled its inhabitants' 
ability to connect to the Internet. Nepal and Burma have both 
experienced intranational government Internet shutdowns. 29 In 
response to the Egyptian upnsmg, Chinese officials blocked 
information relating to the Egyptian revolt from its estimated four 
hundred and fifty-seven million Internet users. 30 On a broader scale, 
the Chinese government completely disabled Internet connectivity in 
the Xinjiang region in 2009 following dissident political activity.31 
These aforementioned international examples demonstrate that 
foreign governments have been successful, at least to a noteworthy 
degree, in disabling or limiting Internet use within their own borders. 
However, even if the United States had the ability to disable Internet 
access within its borders, it is unclear whether it would be legally able 
to do so, given the Nation's rich history of protecting free speech and 
upholding the separation of powers. Arguably, the Internet is itself a 
distinctly American concept, built upon the "freedom of information 
and free flows of data. "32 Measures to constrict this freedom should 
be critically evaluated, even when balanced against the importance of 
safeguarding national security. 
28. See id. ("[S]ome 93 percent of Egyptian networks have been taken 
offline. There's at least one major ISP -- Noor Group -- up and running, 
the same one that hosts Egypt's stock exchange."). 
29. See Jonathan Zittrain and Molly Sauter, Will the U.S. Get an Internet 
"Kill Switch"?, TECH. REV. (Mar. 4, 2011), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/web/32451/?mod=chfeatured&a=f 
(describing the brief internet shut-downs in Nepal in 2005 and Burma in 
2007). 
30. See Jeremy Page, Beijing Blocks Protest Reports, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 
2011), . . 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704832704576113810779 
590744.html ("China's state media have provided limited coverage of 
the unrest in Egypt, including the scores of reported deaths, the cutting 
of Internet and cellphone access, and President Hosni Mubarak's 
appointment of a vice president."). 
31. See id. ("Chinese authorities also stepped up their efforts to control the 
Internet after the 'color revolutions' in the former Soviet Union in 2003-
05, and the pro-democracy protests in Iran in 2009. They completely 
shut down Internet access in the northwe::;tern Chinese region of 
Xinjiang for several months after riots there in 2009. "). 
32. Segura-Serrano, supra note 19, at 231. 
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II. THE PROPOSED "KILL SWITCH" BILL 
A. Provisions of the Bill 
In 2010, legislation was introduced in the U.S. Senate specifying 
the conditions under which the government would have the ability to 
activate a kill switch.33 The proposed bill, "S.3480: Protecting 
Cyberspace as a National Asset Act,"34 would grant the President the 
power to disable the Internet in the event of an emergency.35 This 
bipartisan bill was co-sponsored by Senators on the Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee: Maine Senator Susan 
Collins, the ranking Republican on the Committee, 36 Connecticut 
Independent Senator Joseph Lieberman, the Committee Chairman,37 
and Delaware Democratic Senator Tom Carper.38 
This bill, which was approved by a Senate panel, _would create a 
governmental agency called the National Center for Cybersecurity 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
S. 3480 § 249, lllth Cong. (2010); Chloe Albanesius, Lieberman Backs 
Away From "Internet Kill Switch", PC MAG (June 21, 2010, 3:19 P~), 
http:// www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2365393,00.asp (recountmg 
that the controversy swirling around the bill "prompted many to dub 
[the] option an 'Internet kill switch"'); Jon Orlin, In Search of 
the Internet Kill Switch, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 6, 2011), 
http://techcrunch.com/2011/03/06/in-search-of-the-internet-kill-switch/ 
("It became known as the Internet 'kill switch' bill even though the 
words 'kill' and 'switch' are not found in the bill."); Matthew Schafer, 
How the Internet "Kill Switch" Bill Became the Bulwark of Internet 
Independence, GROUND REP. (Feb. 21, 2011), 
http://www.groundreport.com/Media_and_Tech/How-the-Inter~et-. 
Kill-Switch-Bill-Became-the-Bulwa/2934942 (notmg that the bill was 
"subject to a maelstrom of controversy" after being dubbed 
a kill switch); see also Declan McCullagh, Senators Propose Granting 
President Emergency Internet Power, CNET NEWS (June 10, 2010, 8:25 
PM), http:// news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20007418-~8.html 
(recognizing "few limits on the president's emergency power, which can 
be renewed indefinitely," and noting industry concerns over "the 
potential for absolute power."). 
S. 3480 § 249, lllth Cong. (2010); see Meredith Jessup, Committee 
Passes Plan for Internet "Kill Switch" in Egypt- U.S., THE BLAZE (Jan. 
29, 2011, 1:52 PM), http:/ /www.theblaze.com/stories/committee-passes-
plan-for-internet-kill-switch-in-egypt-u-s /. 
S. 3480 § 249; see Knowles, supra note 2 ("Championed by Sen. Joe 
Lieberman, the bill would give President Barack Obama . . . control to 
snuff out the Internet in one fell swoop during a so-called. "cyber-
emergency[.] "). 
Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status 111th Congress 
2010) S.3480 Cosponsors (last · visited Oct. 
2012), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 11 :SN03480:@@@P. 
Id. 
{2009-
17, 
38. Id. 
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and Communications ("NCCC").39 The NCCC, which would operate 
under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security,40 would 
have the broad power to control the Internet, including the ability to 
shut down the web for a 30-day period. 41 The proposed agency would 
"oversee the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, which 
disseminates cybersecurity information from researchers and the 
government to the private sector. "42 This bill would also create a 
White House Office of Cyberspace Policy to supervise all "instruments 
of national power relating to ensuring the security and resiliency of 
cyberspace," and enforce security standards governing the public and 
private sector established by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST).43 
No one yet understands the bill's full possible ramifications. In 
fact, it may not be realistically feasible to implement, as the United 
States has more decentralized ISPs than Egypt.44 As a result of 
public outrage over the pending legislation, the new draft of the 221-
page bill explicitly forbids the government from entirely disconnecting 
a user's computer from the Intemet.45 The proposed bill stipulates 
that the President would have the power to shut down "critical 
infrastructure" during a devastating cyberattack on the country, or in 
39. S. 3480 § 242(a)(l); see Jessup, supra note 34. 
40. S. 3480 § 242(a)(l); Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29 (describing the 
structure of the proposed National Center for Cybersecurity and 
Communications). 
41. S. 3480, § 249(b)(l); Jessup, supra note 34. 
42. S. 3480 § 244; Zittrain. and Sauter, supra note 29. 
43. S. 3480 § 102(b) (9) ("The Director shall .... coordinate and ensure to 
the maximum extent practicable, that the standards and guidellnes 
developed for national security systems and the standards and guidelines 
under section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) are complementary and unified."). 
44. Jessup, supra note 34 ("The U.S. telecommunication industry is much 
more ~omp!e:X: a~d far more decentralized [than Egypt's]. To do 
somethmg s1m1lar m the U.S. would require a lot more than four phone 
calls."). 
45. S. 3480 § 249(a)(3)(A); see Declan McCullagh Internet "Kill Switch" 
Bill Gets a Makeover, CNET (Feb. lB, 2011, 6:27 PM), 
htt~://n~ws.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20033717-281.html (describing the 
revised bill and its potential ramifications); see also Zittrain and Sauter, 
supra note 29 (stating that critical infrastructure protected by the bill is 
narrowly defined as "systems whose 'disruption or destruction would 
caus~ ~ mass casualty ~vent which includes an extraordinary number of 
fatalities; severe economic consequences; mass evacuations with a 
proior:~e? ~bsenc~; or severe degradation of national security 
capabilities, mcludmg intelligence and defense functions.' . . . . most 
Web servers would not qualify as that type of infrastructure------nor 
would a small ISP."). 
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anticipation of such an attack. 46 This bill calls for the Department of 
Homeland Security to establish and maintain a list of systems or 
assets that constitute critical cyber-infrastructure. 47 The Department 
would also be authorized to take action against privately-owned 
computer systems. 48 The proposed legislation precludes judicial 
review for critical infrastructure, and requires the President to consult 
Congress before taking action. 49 
The breadth of power that the proposed bill facially imparts is 
not without serious checks. According to Senator Lieberman, the 
legislation is limited to protecting only "the most critical 
infrastructures that Americans rely on in their daily lives-energy 
transmission, water supply, [and] financial services[.]"50 The President 
may be precluded from taking action pursuant to the bill unless a 
cyberattack would cause more than twenty-five billion dollars in 
damages in the span of a year, kill more than 2,500 people, and force 
mass evacuations.51 Under the bill, the Executive's emergency actions 
are only authorized for thirty days, with potential thirty-day 
extensions.52 
These drastic restrictions make the possibility of action pursuant 
to the bill rather unlikely, or so one hopes. In order to constitute the 
kind of emergency covered by the proposed bill, the danger would 
need to be "a massive computer-virus or physical attack in which 
46. S. 3480 § 249(a)(l); Suzanne Phan, Egypt Flips Internet Kill Switch, 
Congress Considers Similar Bill, NEWSlO ABC (Feb. 2, 2011, 11:35 
AM), 
http://www.news10.net/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=l20886&provide 
r=top ("[The Bill] wouldn't allow the president to actually shut down 
the Internet. But it would give him the ability to shut down 'critical 
infrastructure' if there was ever a serious cyber attack on the country."). 
47. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 210E(a)(2) codified 6 U.S.C. 
1241(a)(2); Jessup, supra note 34. 
48. S. 3480 § 249(a)(3)(A); see McCullagh, supra note 45 ("The 221-page 
bill hands Homeland Security the power to issue decrees to certain 
privately owned computer systems after the president declares a 
"national cyberemergency. "). 
49. Swartz, supra note 9. 
50. McCullagh, supra note 45. 
51. Id. (describing how Senators "hope" that Homeland Security will take a 
combination of these types of factors into consideration before utilizing 
the kill switch, however, these restraints are "nonbinding and [do not] 
actually appear in the legislation."); see also Swartz, supra note 9 
(stating that the bill specifically does not grant the President power to 
act unless these factors are met, and the President would be empowered 
to "pinpoint what to clamp down on without causing economic damage 
to U.S. interests."). 
52. S. 3480 § 249(b)(2); see also Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29. 
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and Communications ("NCCC").39 The NCCC, which would operate 
under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security,40 would 
have the broad power to control the Internet, including the ability to 
shut down the web for a 30-day period. 41 The proposed agency would 
"oversee the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, which 
disseminates cybersecurity information from researchers and the 
government to the private sector. "42 This bill would also create a 
White House Office of Cyberspace Policy to supervise all "instruments 
of national power relating to ensuring the security and resiliency of 
cyberspace," and enforce security standards governing the public and 
private sector established by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST).43 
No one yet understands the bill's full possible ramifications. In 
fact, it may not be realistically feasible to implement, as the United 
States has more decentralized ISPs than Egypt.44 As a result of 
public outrage over the pending legislation, the new draft of the 221-
page bill explicitly forbids the government from entirely disconnecting 
a user's computer from the Internet.45 The proposed bill stipulates 
that the President would have the power to shut down "critical 
infrastructure" during a devastating cyberattack on the country, or in 
39. S. 3480 § 242(a)(l); see Jessup, supra note 34. 
40. S. 3480 § 242(a)(l); Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29 (describing the 
structure of the proposed National Center for Cybersecurity and 
Communications). 
41. S. 3480, § 249(b)(l); Jessup, supra note 34. 
42. S. 3480 § 244; Zittrain. and Sauter, supra note 29. 
43. S. 3480 § 102(b) (9) ("The Director shall .... coordinate and ensure, to 
the maximum extent practicable, that the standards and guidelines 
developed for national security systems and the standards and guidelines 
under section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) are complementary and unified."). 
44. Jessup, supra note 34 ("The U.S. telecommunication industry is much 
more ~omp!eX: a~d far more decentralized [than Egypt's]. To do 
somethmg similar m the U.S. would require a lot more than four phone 
calls."). 
45. S. 3480 § 249(a)(3)(A); see Declan McCullagh Internet ((Kill Switch" 
Bill Gets a Makeover, CNET (Feb. lS, 2011, 6:27 PM), 
htt:p://n~ws.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20033717-281.html (describing the 
revised bill and its potential ramifications); see also Zittrain and Sauter, 
supra note 29 (stating that critical infrastructure protected by the bill is 
narrowly defined as "systems whose 'disruption or destruction would 
caus~ ~ mass casualty ~vent which includes an extraordinary number of 
fatabties; severe economic consequences; mass evacuations with a 
prolor:~e~ ~bsenc~; or severe degradation of national security 
capabibties, mcludmg intelligence and defense functions.' . . . . most 
Web servers would not qualify as that type of infrastructure-·--·nor 
would a small ISP.''). 
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anticipation of such an attack.46 This bill calls for the Department of 
Homeland Security to establish and maintain a list of systems or 
assets that constitute critical cyber-infrastructure. 47 The Department 
would also be authorized to take action against privately-owned 
computer systems.48 The proposed legislation precludes judicial 
review for critical infrastructure, and requires the President to consult 
Congress before taking action. 49 
The breadth of power that the proposed bill facially imparts is 
not without serious checks. According to Senator Lieberman, the 
legislation is limited to protecting only "the most critical 
infrastructures that Americans rely on in their daily lives-energy 
transmission, water supply, [and] financial services[.]"50 The President 
may be precluded from taking action pursuant to the bill unless a 
cyberattack would cause more than twenty-five billion dollars in 
damages in the span of a year, kill more than 2,500 people, and force 
mass evacuations.51 Under the bill, the Executive's emergency actions 
are only authorized for thirty days, with potential thirty-day 
extensions. 52 
These drastic restrictions make the possibility of action pursuant 
to the bill rather unlikely, or so one hopes. In order to constitute the 
kind of emergency covered by the proposed bill, the danger would 
need to be "a massive computer-virus or physical attack in which 
46. S. 3480 § 249(a)(l); Suzanne Phan, Egypt Flips Internet Kill Switch, 
Congress Considers Similar Bill, NEWSlO ABC (Feb. 2, 2011, 11:35 
AM), 
http://www.newslO.net/ news/local/ story .aspx?storyid= 120886&provide 
r=top ("[The Bill] wouldn't allow the president to actually shut down 
the Internet. But it would give him the ability to shut down 'critical 
infrastructure' if there was ever a serious cyber attack on the country."). 
47. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 210E(a)(2) codified 6 U.S.C. 
1241(a)(2); Jessup, supra note 34. 
48. S. 3480 § 249(a)(3)(A); see McCullagh, supra note 45 ("The 221-page 
bill hands Homeland Security the power to issue decrees to certain 
privately owned computer systems after the president declares a 
"national cyberemergency."). 
49. Swartz, supra note 9. 
50. McCullagh, supra note 45. 
51. Id. (describing how Senators "hope" that Homeland Security will take a 
combination of these types of factors into consideration before utilizing 
the kill switch, however, these restraints are "nonbinding and [do not] 
actually appear in the legislation."); see also Swartz, supra note 9 
(stating that the bill specifically does not grant the President power to 
act unless these factors are met, and the President would be empowered 
to "pinpoint what to clamp down on without causing economic damage 
to U.S. interests."). 
52. S. 3480 § 249(b)(2); see also Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29. 
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ISPs stood idly by as malware spread like wildfire. "53 This makes the 
realistic necessity of enforcing the bill unclear. In the event of a 
catastrophe rising to the level specified in the proposed legislation, it 
is unlikely that governmental action would be able to mitigate the 
situation. ISPs would likely take measures on their own to counter 
any such adumbrated disasters, and arguably, the ISP's engineers 
would already be in a better position to take action than the 
government.54 Yet the bill's extra protection, even if never used, may 
be critical in the remote likelihood that a catastrophic event occurs 
and the ISPs are either unable or unwilling to take action. 55 
B. The Legality of the "Kill Switch" Bill 
1. The Power of the Executive Branch 
The President may already possess the necessary authority to 
shut down Internet's infrastructure without resorting to using the 
powers conferred by the proposed bill. 56 Under section 706 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, pursuant to a provision added in 1941, 
the President has the power to shut down "any facility or station for 
wire communication. "57 Thus, theoretically the President may 
lawfully take control of these infrastructures if a triggering event 
causes a "state of war."58 In the wake of such an event, the federal 
government may control these facilities for up to six months.59 The 
Department of Homeland Security has cited section 706 as "one of the 
authorities the President would rely on if the nation were under a 
53. Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29. 
54. Id. (in the event of a massive attack "it's not clear that government 
intervention would make any difference. The ISPs would already be 
doing everything they could to counter the attack. And there's no 
reason to believe that the government would have any comparative 
advantage in understanding the situation better than the Internet 
engineers themselves."). 
55. See id. (describing how ISPs would be better suited to deal with a 
cyberattack,which leads to the inference that the government may only 
need to act if the ISPs are unable or unwilling to do so). 
56. Id. 
57. Communications Act of 1934 § 706; 47 U.S.C. § 606(d)(2011); Zittrain 
and Sauter, supra note 29 ("Section 706 of the Communications of Act 
of 1934-written into the Act shortly after the 1941 attack on Pearl 
Harbor-gives the President the power to shut down "any facility or 
station for wire communication" or take federal control of such facilities 
in the event of a "state of war" and for up to six months after the 
expiration of such a state."). 
58. Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29. 
59. Communications Act of 1934 § 706; 47 U.S.C. § 606(d)(2011); Zittrain 
and Sauter, supra note 29. 
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Cyberattack."60 Notably, in congressional testimony, Phillip 
Reitinger, the former Deputy Undersecretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security, stated that "Congress and the Administration 
should work together to identify any needed adjustments to the [1934] 
Act, as opposed to developing overlapping legislation. "61 
The Founding Fathers' caution towards the power of the federal 
government is reflected in the spirit of the Constitution. 62 Each 
branch is limited to the powers bestowed upon it by the Constitution, 
in a system of checks and balances. The Constitution imbues each of 
the three branches of government with inherent but limited powers. 
Article 1 imbues the Legislature with power;63 Article 2, the 
Executive;64 and Article 3, the Judiciary.65 In Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson's concurring opinion demarcated 
a tripartite model of the separation of powers, stipulating that the 
Executive's powers are at their strongest when supported by the 
explicit authority of the legislature. 66 Under this constitutional 
analysis,, the President's authority to disable Internet connectivity 
should the kill switch bill become law is likely justified under the 
powers delineated in Article I and Article II, in conjunction with 
Section 706 of the 1934 Act. 
However, the constitutional rights afforded to citizens must 
continue to check the breadth of the Executive's powers, which 
60. Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29 (indicating that this may be the case, 
although the "War Congress of 1941 wasn't thinking about the 
Internet," when they wrote this provision). 
61. Paul Rosenzweig, The Internet "Kill Switch" Debate, LAWFARE, (Feb. 2, 
2012, 11:10 AM), http:/ /www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/the-internet-
kill-switch-debate/. 
62. See THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The idea of 
restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the 
national defense, is one of those refinements which owe their origin to a 
zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened."). 
63. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a 
Senate and House of Representatives."). 
64. U.S. CONST. art. 2 § 1 (''The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America."). 
65. U.S. CONST. art. 3 § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States shall 
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). 
66. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the three-part test for 
presidential power, and stating that "[w]hen the President acts pursuant 
to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its 
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all 
that Congress can delegate."). 
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ISPs stood idly by as malware spread like wildfire. "53 This makes the 
realistic necessity of enforcing the bill unclear. In the event of a 
catastrophe rising to the level specified in the proposed legislation, it 
is unlikely that governmental action would be able to mitigate the 
situation. ISPs would likely take measures on their own to counter 
any such adumbrated disasters, and arguably, the ISP's engineers 
would already be in a better position to take action than the 
government.54 Yet the bill's extra protection, even if never used, may 
be critical in the remote likelihood that a catastrophic event occurs 
and the ISPs are either unable or unwilling to take action. 55 
B. The Legality of the "Kill Switch" Bill 
1. The Power of the Executive Branch 
The President may already possess the necessary authority to 
shut down Internet's infrastructure without resorting to using the 
powers conferred by the proposed bill. 56 Under section 706 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, pursuant to a provision added in 1941, 
the President has the power to shut down "any facility or station for 
wire communication. "57 Thus, theoretically the President may 
lawfully take control of these infrastructures if a triggering event 
causes a "state of war. "58 In the wake of such an event, the federal 
government may control these facilities for up to six months.59 The 
Department of Homeland Security has cited section 706 as "one of the 
authorities the President would rely on if the nation were under a 
53. Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29. 
54. Id. (in the event of a massive attack "it's not clear that government 
intervention would make any difference. The ISPs would already be 
doing everything they could to counter the attack. And there's no 
reason to believe that the government would have any comparative 
advantage in understanding the situation better than the Internet 
engineers themselves."). 
55. See id. (describing how ISPs would be better suited to deal with a 
cyberattack,which leads to the inference that the government may only 
need to act if the ISPs are unable or unwilling to do so). 
56. Id. 
57. Communications Act of 1934 § 706; 47 U.S.C. § 606(d)(2011); Zittrain 
and Sauter, supra note 29 ("Section 706 of the Communications of Act 
of 1934-written into the Act shortly after the 1941 attack on Pearl 
Harbor-gives the President the power to shut down "any facility or 
station for wire communication" or take federal control of such facilities 
in the event of a "state of war" and for up to six months after the 
expiration of such a state."). 
58. Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29. 
59. Communications Act of 1934 § 706; 47 U.S.C. § 606(d)(2011); Zittrain 
and Sauter, supra note 29. 
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Cyberattack. "60 Notably, in congressional testimony, Phillip 
Reitinger, the former Deputy Undersecretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security, stated that "Congress and the Administration 
should work together to identify any needed adjustments to the [1934] 
Act, as opposed to developing overlapping legislation. "61 
The Founding Fathers' caution towards the power of the federal 
government is reflected in the spirit of the Constitution. 62 Each 
branch is limited to the powers bestowed upon it by the Constitution, 
in a system of checks and balances. The Constitution imbues each of 
the three branches of government with inherent but limited powers. 
Article 1 imbues the Legislature with power;63 Article 2, the 
Executive;64 and Article 3, the Judiciary.65 In Youngstown Sheet f:J 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson's concurring opinion demarcated 
a tripartite model of the separation of powers, stipulating that the 
Executive's powers are at their strongest when supported by the 
explicit authority of the legislature. 66 Under this constitutional 
analysis,, the President's authority to disable Internet connectivity 
should the kill switch bill become law is likely justified under the 
powers delineated in Article I and Article II, in conjunction with 
Section 706 of the 1934 Act. 
However, the constitutional rights afforded to citizens must 
continue· to check the breadth of the Executive's powers, which 
60. Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29 (indicating that this may be the case, 
although the "War Congress of 1941 wasn't thinking about the 
Internet," when they wrote this provision). 
61. Paul Rosenzweig, The Internet "Kill Switch" Debate, LAWFARE, (Feb. 2, 
2012, 11:10 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/the-internet-
kill-switch-debate/. 
62. See THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The idea of 
restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the 
national defense, is one of those refinements which owe their origin to a 
zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened."). 
63. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a 
Senate and House of Representatives."). 
64. U.S. CONST. art. 2 § 1 (''The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America."). 
65. U.S. CONST. art. 3 § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States shall 
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). 
66. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 
( 1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the three-part test for 
presidential power, and stating that "[w]hen the President acts pursuant 
to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its 
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all 
that Congress can delegate."). 
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expand in times of danger and warfare. In Hamdi v Rumsfeld, the 
Supreme Court ruled, inter alia, that an enemy combatant must 
receive notice of the allegations against him; however, the government 
may tailor these proceedings to help alleviate the burden that this 
type of trial places on the government.67 The plurality stressed the 
need to balance governmental concerns with those of individuals.68 
The Hamdi Court stated that "history and common sense"69 have 
demonstrated that "war is not a blank check"70 to encroach on the 
separation of powers by disproportionately strengthening the power of 
the Executive. 71 
When considering the proposed kill switch bill under the 
provisions of Hamdi, it is clear that individual rights limit the 
Executive's powers, even in the case of exigent circumstances. 
However, Hamdi does not delineate the extent to which the 
Executive's powers can be strengthened in a time of peril or when 
exactly that peril is sufficient to justify otherwise extra-legal action. 
While the proposed terms of the kill switch bill include a high 
threshold of collateral damage to trigger the Executive's interference 
with Internet connectivity, some might argue that the resulting broad 
Executive Powers would be a "blank check" forbidden under Hamdi. 
If just one keystroke can render severe damage, how high would the 
corresponding likelihood of the attack need to be in order to trigger 
the powers of the kill switch bill? 
Justices Souter, in his Hamdi concurrence, emphasized that the 
Executive branch must confine use of its emergency powers unless 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) ("We therefore hold that a 
citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy 
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification[.] 
. . . [E]nemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their 
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing 
military conflict."). 
Id. at 536-37 (noting that "it would turn our system of checks and 
balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to 
court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention"). 
Id. at 530 ("[H]istory and common sense teach us that an unchecked 
system of detention carries the potential to become a means for 
oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat."). 
Id. at 536 ("We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a 
blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the 
Nations' citizens."). 
Id. ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the 
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy 
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for 
all three branches when individual liberties are at stake."). 
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supported by specific instances of emergencies.72 However, in the age 
of the Internet, the question becomes how the Government can 
determine whether a specific emergency is occurring, when many 
cyberattacks may occur simultaneously. Given the ease and speed in 
which attacks can be perpetrated, it may be unrealistic for the 
Executive Branch to ask Congress for permission to act or consult 
with the Attorney General regarding the legality of the intended 
measures. 
2. Protections Granted by the First Amendment 
i. The Individual Right 
In addition to implicating the scope of the Executive power, the 
kill switch bill may impede on an individual's First Amendment right 
to post content on the Internet. 73 As the measures proposed by the 
bill would allow the NCCC to shut down the Internet for a thirty-day 
period, 74 these, concerns also may encompass the ability of Americans 
to access another person's writing. For example, nearly sixty percent 
of Americans access the news from their computers. 75 
Many civil rights organizations have questioned the kill switch 
bill's effect on American freedom and civil liberties.76 The American 
Civil Liberty Union's legislative counsel, Michelle Richardson, claimed 
that the issue surrounding the proposed bill was never that a literal 
kill switch could eviscerate Internet access completely.77 Richardson 
explained that "[t]he question is bigger than that. It's generally, can 
the government interfere with communications ... The question i~: 
Are there significant protections in there?"78 Similarly, the Electromc 
Frontier Foundation's legal director and general counsel, Cindy Cohn, 
stated that what happened in Egypt "highlights the dangers of any 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
Id. at 541 (Souter, J. concurring) (noting that in the absence of a 
specific reason for detention, the detainee, in the matter at hand, may 
be entitled to release). 
See Jessup, supra note 34 (noting the concern that various interest 
groups have voiced that "the measure, if it became law, might be used 
to censor the internet"). 
S. 3480 § 242; see Jessup, supra note 34. 
Jessup, supra note 34 ("at least 603 of Americans get their daily news 
from the Internet."). 
Id. ("About two dozen groups, including the American Civil Liberties 
Union the American Library Association, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and Center for Democracy &Technology, were skeptical 
enough to file an open letter opposing the idea."). 
McCullagh, supra note 45 ("The ACLU's Richardson believes the 
problem was never a 'kill switch."'). 
Id. 
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expand in times of danger and warfare. In Hamdi v Rumsfeld, the 
Supreme Court ruled, inter alia, that an enemy combatant must 
receive notice of the allegations against him; however, the government 
may tailor these proceedings to help alleviate the burden that this 
type of trial places on the government.67 The plurality stressed the 
need to balance governmental concerns with those of individuals.68 
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corresponding likelihood of the attack need to be in order to trigger 
the powers of the kill switch bill? 
Justices Souter, in his Hamdi concurrence, emphasized that the 
Executive branch must confine use of its emergency powers unless 
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citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy 
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification[.] 
. . . [E]nemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their 
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing 
military conflict."). 
Id. at 536-37 (noting that "it would turn our system of checks and 
balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to 
court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention"). 
Id. at 530 ("[H]istory and common sense teach us that an unchecked 
system of detention carries the potential to become a means for 
oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat."). 
Id. at 536 ("We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a 
blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the 
Nations' citizens."). 
Id. ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the 
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy 
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for 
all three branches when individual liberties are at stake."). 
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supported by specific instances of emergencies.72 However, in the age 
of the Internet, the question becomes how the Government can 
determine whether a specific emergency is occurring, when many 
cyberattacks may occur simultaneously. Given the ease and speed in 
which attacks can be perpetrated, it may be unrealistic for the 
Executive Branch to ask Congress for permission to act or consult 
with the Attorney General regarding the legality of the intended 
measures. 
2. Protections Granted by the First Amendment 
i. The Individual Right 
In addition to implicating the scope of the Executive power, the 
kill switch bill may impede on an individual's First Amendment right 
to post content on the Internet.73 As the measures proposed by the 
bill would allow the NCCC to shut down the Internet for a thirty-day 
period, 74 these, concerns also may encompass the ability of Americans 
to access another person's writing. For example, nearly sixty percent 
of Americans access the news from their computers.75 
Many civil rights organizations have questioned the kill switch 
bill's effect on American freedom and civil liberties.76 The American 
Civil Liberty Union's legislative counsel, Michelle Richardson, claimed 
that the issue surrounding the proposed bill was never that a literal 
kill switch could eviscerate Internet access completely.77 Richardson 
explained that "[t]he question is bigger than that. It's generally, can 
the government interfere with communications ... The question i~: 
Are there significant protections in there?"78 Similarly, the Electromc 
Frontier Foundation's legal director and general counsel, Cindy Cohn, 
stated that what happened in Egypt "highlights the dangers of any 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
Id. at 541 (Souter, J. concurring) (noting that in the absence of a 
specific reason for detention, the detainee, in the matter at hand, may 
be entitled to release). 
See Jessup, supra note 34 (noting the concern that various interest 
groups have voiced that "the measure, if it became law, might be used 
to censor the internet"). 
S. 3480 § 242; see Jessup, supra note 34. 
Jessup, supra note 34 ("at least 603 of Americans get their daily news 
from the Internet."). 
Id. ("About two dozen groups, including the American Civil Liberties 
Union the American Library Association, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and Center for Democracy &Technology, were skeptical 
enough to file an open letter opposing the idea."). 
McCullagh, supra note 45 ("The ACLU's Richardson believes the 
problem was never a 'kill switch."'). 
Id. 
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government having unchecked power over our Internet 
infrastructure. "79 
The issue then becomes whether there are grounds for these 
concerns, and to what extent the Constitution protects a citizen's 
First Amendment freedom of speech and expression in regard to the 
Internet. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law. 
· · abridging the freedom of speech, nso but does this text actually 
prote~t the right to access the Internet? "Under th[eJ [public forum] 
doctrme, U.S. courts impose on the government the affirmative oblig~tion t? make public facilities available for persons wanting to 
exercise therr free speech rights. nsi But; can the kill switch bill meet 
judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment? To answer these 
questions, this Article explores the case law that defines the 
parameters of accepted- limitations on free speech under the First 
Amendment. · 
ii. Applicable Tests for First Amendment Limitations 
In Whitney v. California, the Supreme Court held that there is no 
absolute freedom of speech. s2 Whitney sets forth the standard that 
state.s .do not violate an individual's Constitutional rights when they 
proh1b1t speech that may "incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or 
endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten the 
overthrow by unlawful means. "S3 In his celebrated concurrence 
Justice Brandeis expounded that freedom of speech rights ar~ 
"fundamental [but] they are not in their nature absolute."s4 He 
stressed that "fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
Egypt's Internet Blackout Revives U.S. "Kill Switch" Debate, HOMELAND 
SEC.. NEWS _wrRE . (Feb. 7, 2011), 
http.// WWW .homelandsecuntynewswrre.com/ egypts-internet-blackout-
revives-us-kill-.switch-debate ("The lesson of Egypt is that no one, not 
even the President of the United States, should be given the power to 
turn off the Internet."). 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
Segura-Serrano, supra note 19, at 261. 
Whitney v: C~lifornia, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) ("That the freedom of 
s?eech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute 
nght t~ speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an 
unrestncted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible 
use of language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this 
freedom; and that a State in the exercise of its police power may punish 
those who ~buse ~hi~ freedo~ by utterances inimical to the public 
welfare, ten~mg to mc1te to crrme, disturb the public peace, or endanger 
the foundations ~f organized government and threaten its overthrow by 
unlawful means, is not open to question."). 
Id. at 371. 
Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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free speech and assembly," an~ to. justify such ~up~re~sion,. the 
implicating speech must pose an 1mmment danger wh1~h 1s :elat1vely 
serious. ns5 In accordance with the standard set forth m Whitney, the 
kill switch bill would likely meet the necessary standards to render 
First Amendment protections inapplicable. Since the Executive can 
only rely upon this legislation in times of, or in the fear . of, 
catastrophic calamity, the Whitney standard would almost certamly 
be met if the Executive were correct in his or her assessment of the 
likelihood of danger on the basis of known information at the time of 
the threat. 
The kill switch bill may further be proven legal pursuant to the 
historical standards set forth that the government must meet before 
encroaching upon First Amendment rights. In evaluating when 
dangerous conditions override First Amendment concern~, the 
Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States created and applied the 
"clear and present danger" test.s6 This Court noted that "[w]hen a 
nation is at war many things that might be said in times of peace are 
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be 
endured[.]"s7 This allows the abridgement of free speech w~en the 
resulting advocated action is one that Congress has the nght to 
prevent.ss In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has held that 
a causal link between the speech and disturbance is necessary when 
abridging First Amendment rights, and that the speec~ m~st ha:e 
more than a tenuous relationship to the feared repercussrnns. While 
this is a common standard for evaluating the abridgement of First 
Amendment rights, a dormant, yet not overruled test put forth in 
Dennis v. United States, focuses on whether the "gravity of the 'evil,' 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
Id. at 376-77. 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ('The question in every 
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are 
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent."). 
Id. 
Id. ("The most stringent protection of free speec~ would. not protect a 
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causmg pamc. It does not 
even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may 
have all the effect of force."). 
Cf., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393.1:LS. 50?, 5.09 
(1969) ("In order for the State in. the pers?~ of s.chool officials to Justify 
prohibition of a particular express10n of opm10n, it must be able to. show 
that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to 
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint."). 
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government having unchecked power over our Internet 
infrastructure. "79 
The issue then becomes whether there are grounds for these 
concerns, and to what extent the Constitution protects a citizen's 
First Amendment freedom of speech and expression in regard to the 
Internet. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law. 
. . abridging the freedom of speech, "80 but does this text actually 
prote~t the right to ac~ess the Internet? "Under th[e] [public forum] 
doctrme, U.S. courts impose on the government the affirmative 
obligation to make public facilities available for persons wanting to 
exercise their free speech rights. "81 But; can the kill switch bill meet 
judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment? To answer these 
questions, this Article explores the case law that defines the 
parameters of accepted- limitations on free speech under the First 
Amendment. · 
ii. Applicable Tests for First Amendment Limitations 
In Whitney v. California, the Supreme Court held that there is no 
absolute freedom of speech. 82 Whitney sets forth the standard that 
state_s _do not violate an individual's Constitutional rights when they 
prohibit speech that may "incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or 
endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten the 
overthrow by unlawful means. "83 In his celebrated concurrence 
Justice Brandeis expounded that freedom of speech rights ar~ 
"fundamental [but] they are not in their nature absolute. "84 He 
stressed that "fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of 
79. Egypt's Internet Blackout Revives U.S. "Kill Switch" Debate, HOMELAND 
SEC. NEWS WIRE (Feb. 7, 2011), 
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/ egypts-internet-blackout-
revives-us-kill-switch-debate ("The lesson of Egypt is that no one not 
even the President of the United States, should be given the pow~r to 
turn off the Internet."). 
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
81. Segura-Serrano, supra note 19, at 261. 
82. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) ("That the freedom of 
speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute 
right t~ speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an 
unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible 
use of language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this 
freedom; and that a State in the exercise of its police power may punish 
those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public 
welfare, ten?ing to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger 
the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by 
unlawful means, is not open to question."). 
83. Id. at 371. 
84. Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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free speech and assembly," and to justify such suppression, the 
implicating speech must pose an imminent danger whi~h is "~elatively 
serious. "85 In accordance with the standard set forth m Whitney, the 
kill switch bill would likely meet the necessary standards to render 
First Amendment protections inapplicable. Since the Executive can 
only rely upon this legislation in times of, or in the fear . of, 
catastrophic calamity, the Whitney standard would almost certamly 
be met if the Executive were correct in his or her assessment of the 
likelihood of danger on the basis of known information at the time of 
the threat. 
The kill switch bill may further be proven legal pursuant to the 
historical standards set forth that the government must meet before 
encroaching upon First Amendment rights. In evaluating when 
dangerous conditions override First Amendment concern~, the 
Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States created and applied the 
"clear and present danger" test.86 This Court noted that "[w]hen a 
nation is at war many things that might be said in times of peace are 
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be 
endured[.]"87 This allows the abridgement of free speech w~en the 
resulting advocated action is one that Congress has the nght to 
prevent.88 In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has held that 
a causal link between the speech and disturbance is necessary when 
abridging First Amendment rights, and that the speec~ m~st ha:e 
more than a tenuous relationship to the feared repercuss10ns. While 
this is a common standard for evaluating the abridgement of First 
Amendment rights, a dormant, yet not overruled test put forth in 
Dennis v. United States, focuses on whether the "gravity of the 'evil,' 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
Id. at 376-77. 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ('The question in every 
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are 
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent. "). 
Id. 
Id. ("The most stringent protection of free speec~ would. not protect a 
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causmg pamc. It does not 
even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may 
have all the effect of force."). 
Cf., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393_ 1:I.S. 50~, 5_09 
(1969) ("In order for the State in_ the pers?~ of s_chool officials to Justify 
prohibition of a particular expression of opimon, it must be able to_ show 
that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to 
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint."). 
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dis~ounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech 
as 1s necessary to avoid the danger. "90 
The kill switch legislation would likely comply with the Schenck 
st~ndard and meet the stringency of the conditions necessary to 
tngge~ t~e Executive's power under the proposed bill. However, the 
analysis 1s less cl~ar under Dennis. Although attackers may intend to 
cause ~~mage senous enough to meet the first prong of the test,91 the p~obab1lity of the danger coming from its fruition would need to be 
high. en~ugh to merit resorting to the powers granted in the bill. Consid~rmg the. ea~e with which cyberattacks can occur, the 
Executive may conSider multiple attacks "probable." Thus, it is 
unclear w~en governmental action, taken in conjunction with the 
propo~ed bill, could lawfully occur under the second prong92 of the 
Dennis test. 
The modern doct~i~e, put forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio, concerns 
the dangers of political rhetoric and the countervailing First 
Amendment rights. 93 In Brandenburg, the Court found that the 
g?vernme~t ~ou~~ no~ suppress speech unless the speech in question ~Im~d to mc1te 1mmment lawless action. "94 However, this standard 
Is likely inapplic~ble to the ~roposed bill because political speech 
would no~ be an issue unless 1t somehow involved activist terrorists ~ollabo.r~tmg to carry out a cyberattack for political causes. Engaging 
m pohtic~l . s?eech would not be considered extreme enough to 
warran~ lim1tmg access to the Internet under the kill switch bill. 
Accordmgly, th~ Schenck and Dennis tests remain the benchmark 
~ta1:1~ard .by wh1?h this legislation should be evaluated. Thus, the 
J11:diciary Is not likely to declare the bill unconstitutional pursuant to 
F_irst ~mendment concerns .. Even if the political action triggered the 
kill. switch ~owers, the bill still meets the Constitutional standard ~rticulat~d I~ Brandenburg because the potential calamities would 
likely be immment and unlawful. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). 
Id. ("[T]he gravity of the evil[.]"). 
Id. ("[D]iscounted by its improbability[.]"). 
Brandenbur~ v. Ohio, ~95 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (discussing whether an 
act can pu~ish advocatmg or teaching violence as opposed to punishin 
the actual mtent to cause criminal acts). g 
Id. at 447 C".[T]he constitutio~al guarantees of free speech and free press 
do ~ot pen:~it ~ State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force 
or 
0 l~w v~olat~on except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
produci:r:g immment lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action."). 
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iii. Censorship 
Should a court evaluate the proposed kill switch bill in terms of 
censorship under the First Amendment, it would have to assess the 
law according to the standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. 
United States. 95 In this seminal 1971 case, the Executive Branch 
attempted to use its powers to request an injunction against 
publication of the Pentagon Papers.96 In its per curiam decision, the 
Court held that the government shoulders a heavy burden of proof 
when it seeks to override First Amendment protections.97 
Additionally, Justice Black, in his concurrence, noted that a violation 
of free speech was odious to the nation's Founding Fathers.98 
Although the Court did not hold that censorship was per se 
unconstitutional, 99 the case did not state precisely when the Executive 
may censor speech. 
The kill switch bill will have a harder time withstanding 
constitutional scrutiny under the New York Times standard than 
under other First Amendment jurisprudence analyses. Although the 
proposed bill does include what arguably constitutes censorship of the 
Internet, would such censorship be lawful considering the inevitable 
collateral damage? The level of calamity necessary to trigger the bill 
is likely sufficient to protect the rights of free speech under the New 
York Times analysis. Yet, while the government does censor the 
Internet to some extent, would the breadth of the censorship powers 
vested in the Executive under the proposed statute be lawful? 
Although our Founding Fathers were wary of censorship and 
unchecked powers, they could not have. conceived the possibility of a 
massive cyberattack. An American's Constitutional rights must 
protect him or her from this modern, foreseeable danger. The holding 
under New York Times affords a strict standard with regard to the 
restraints on communications; however, the threat of calamities upon 
which the kill switch bill is predicated in order to bar Internet 
95. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
N. Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) 
(explaining that the government must show justification when it 
encroaches upon First Amendment free speech rights). 
Id. at 714-15 (Black, J., concurring) (describing the government's 
attempt to censor newspapers). 
Id. at 714 (per curiam) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression 
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity .... The Government 'thus carries a heavy 
burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint."'). 
Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) ("In the First Amendment the 
Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to 
fulfill its essential role in our democracy."). 
Id. at 714 (per curiam) (noting that the government must show 
justification for placing a restraint on First Amendment free speech). 
75 
JouRNALOFLAw, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET. VoL. 4. No. I· 20I2 
The Sound of Silence 
dis?ounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech 
as IS necessary to avoid the danger. "90 
The kill switch legislation would likely comply with the Schenck 
st~ndard and meet the stringency of the conditions necessary to 
tngge~ t~e Executive's power under the proposed bill. However, the 
analysis is less cl~ar under Dennis. Although attackers may intend to 
cause ~~mage serious enough to meet the first prong of the test,91 the 
p:obab1lity of the danger coming from its fruition would need to be 
high . eno_ugh to merit resorting to the powers granted in the bill. Consid~rmg the . ea~e with which cyberattacks can occur, the 
Executive may conSider multiple attacks "probable." Thus, it is 
unclear w~en governmental action, taken in conjunction with the 
propo~ed bill, could lawfully occur under the second prong92 of the 
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the dangers of political rhetoric and the countervailing First 
Amendment rights. 93 In Brandenburg, the Court found that the 
g?vernmei:t ~ou~~ no~ suppress speech unless the speech in question ~im~d to .mc1te. immment lawless action. "94 However, this standard 18 likely mapplic~ble to the ~roposed bill because political speech 
would no~ be an Issue unless it somehow involved activist terrorists ~ollabo.r~tmg to carry out a cyberattack for political causes. Engaging 
m politic~l . s?eech would not be considered extreme enough to 
warran~ lim1tmg access to the Internet under the kill switch bill. 
Accordmgly, th~ Sche.nck and Dennis tests remain the benchmark ~tai:~ard .by wh1:h this legislation should be evaluated. Thus, the J~diciary is not likely to declare the bill unconstitutional pursuant to 
F.Irst ~mendment concerns. . Even if the political action triggered the 
kill. switch ~owers, the bill still meets the Constitutional standard ~rticulat~d I~ Brandenburg because the potential calamities would 
likely be immment and unlawful. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). 
Id. ("[T]he gravity of the evil[.]"). 
Id. ("[D]iscounted by its improbability[.]"). 
Brandenbur~ v. Ohio, ~95 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (discussing whether an 
act can pu:°-1sh advocatmg or teaching violence as opposed to punishing 
the actual mtent to cause criminal acts). 
Id. at 447 ("_[T]he constitutio~al guarantees of free speech and free press 
do not per~t ~ State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force 
or of l~w v~olat~on except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producu~g munment lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action."). 
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iii. Censorship 
Should a court evaluate the proposed kill switch bill in terms of 
censorship under the First Amendment, it would have to assess the 
law according to the standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. 
United States. 95 In this seminal 1971 case, the Executive Branch 
attempted to use its powers to request an injunction against 
publication of the Pentagon Papers.96 In its per curiam decision, the 
Court held that the government shoulders a heavy burden of proof 
when it seeks to override First Amendment protections.97 
Additionally, Justice Black, in his concurrence, noted that a violation 
of free speech was odious to the nation's Founding Fathers.98 
Although the Court did not hold that censorship was per se 
unconstitutional,99 the case did not state precisely when the Executive 
may censor speech. 
The kill switch bill will have a harder time withstanding 
constitutional scrutiny under the New York Times standard than 
under other First Amendment jurisprudence analyses. Although the 
proposed bill does include what arguably constitutes censorship of the 
Internet, would such censorship be lawful considering the inevitable 
collateral damage? The level of calamity necessary to trigger the bill 
is likely sufficient to protect the rights of free speech under the New 
York Times analysis. Yet, while the government does censor the 
Internet to some extent, would the breadth of the censorship powers 
vested in the Executive under the proposed statute be lawful? 
Although our Founding Fathers were wary of censorship and 
unchecked powers, they could not have conceived the possibility of a 
massive cyberattack. An American's Constitutional rights must 
protect him or her from this modern, foreseeable danger. The holding 
under New York Times affords a strict standard with regard to the 
restraints on communications; however, the threat of calamities upon 
which the kill switch bill is predicated in order to bar Internet 
95. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
N. Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) 
(explaining that the government must show justification when it 
encroaches upon First Amendment free speech rights). 
Id. at 714-15 (Black, J., concurring) (describing the government's 
attempt to censor newspapers). 
Id. at 714 (per curiam) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression 
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity .... The Government 'thus carries a heavy 
burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint."'). 
Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) ("In the First Amendment the 
Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to 
fulfill its essential role in our democracy."). 
Id. at 714 (per curiam) (noting that the government must show 
justification for placing a restraint on First Amendment free speech). 
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connectivity appears likely to withstand scrutiny under the New York 
Times legal analysis. 
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court considered the issue of 
censorship of Internet speech and held that the CDA of 1996 was a 
violation of the First Amendment.100 The Court declared that the 
Internet does not 'invade an individual's home" but users do access it 
through their own free will. 101 The Court found that the CDA did not 
pass strict scrutiny because less restrictive means could not have been 
available other than that utilized by the statute.102 Thus, the Internet 
receives stronger First Amendment protection than broadcast 
media. 103 
The kill switch bill likely would withstand judicial consideration 
under Reno. It is possible that the Supreme Court may determine 
that the ends of protecting the nation from calamity warranted the 
means set forth in the proposed legislation. While the triggering 
events are undoubtedly serious, the question becomes whether a more 
tailored method of protecting critical infrastructure exists without 
granting the Executive additional authority to interfere with Internet 
connectivity. This question warrants serious evaluation. 
Nevertheless, it would be expected that the. judiciary would uphold 
the bill, given the extenuating and extreme triggering circumstances. 
iv. Commercial speech 
The proposed kill switch bill may nevertheless violate an 
individual's right to engage in commercial speech. In addition to 
considering the free speech rights of individuals, the courts also 
evaluate an individual's right under this First Amendment rubric. 
Companies use the Internet to run their businesses and advertise. 
Although advertising is generally protected by the First Amendment, 
the Constitution "affords a lesser protection to commercial speech 
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. "104 To evaluate 
commercial speech, courts use the test set forth in Central Hudson 
100. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (affording the same 
constitutional protections to t~e Internet as are provided to. other types 
of speech). 
101. Id. at 869 ("[C]ommunications over the Internet do not 'invade' an 
individual's home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden. Users 
seldom encounter content 'by accident."'). 
102. Id. at 879 ("We are persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if 
that requirement has any meaning at all."). 
103. See id. at 866 ("Relying on the premise that "of all forms of 
communication" broadcasting has received the most limited First 
Amendment protection."). 
104. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993). 
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Gas fj Electric Corp. v. Public Service Communication. 105 In Central 
Hudson, the Court held that the government may. regulate 
commercial speech if the regulation directly advances an nnportant 
interest and is no more restrictive of speech than necessary. 106 The 
kill switch bill meets this standard. First, as previously discussed, if 
the kill switch bill does not violate the free speech rights of an 
individual, it probably would be lawful under the lesser standard used 
to protect commercial speech. Second, the bill would likely meet the 
Central Hudson test because it would be no more restrictive of speech 
than necessary and would advance the interest of national security 
protection. . . . 
Moreover, while Central Hudson concerns the specific nght to 
advertise, the kill switch bill would not affect the contents of the 
advertisements themselves but rather the vehicle through which they 
advertise. As such, the bill would not deny advertisers the right to 
promote their products but only their ability to market those 
products on the Internet. Hence, this analysis is likely not the 
appropriate First Amendment test and other legal frameworks should 
be applied. 
v. Media 
The First Amendment standards regarding free speech in media 
do not apply to the kill switch bill. These standards are put forth in 
Red Lion v. FCC, in which the Supreme Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of a FCC regulation that mandated broadcasters to 
notify individuals they defamed in their program and accord these 
individuals an opportunity to respond. 107 The Court affirmed the 
constitutionality of the FCC regulation, holding that those who 
obtain licenses to broadcast must comply with the applicable 
conditions to retain that license.108 However, broadcast media is 
distinguishable from the Internet, as the unique characteristics of the 
105. Cent. Hudson Gas f:J Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980) (describing the four-part analysis that applies to First 
Amendment analysis of commercial speech). 
106. Id. at 566. 
107. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (holding 
that the proposed regulations are constitutional, as they 
"enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and press 
' A ") protected by the First mendment . 
108. Id. at 379 ("The statutory authority of the FCC to promulgate these 
regulations derives from the mandate to the 'Commis~ion from. ti~e to 
time, as public convenience, interest, or nec.ess1ty reqmr~s . to 
promulgate 'such rules and regulations and prescribe such res~r.1ctions 
and conditions . . . as may be necessary to carry out the prov1s1ons of 
this chapter."'). 
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Internet include that it is not limited to a finite number of individuals 
or organizations who can post, nor are licenses necessary for its use. 
The Supreme Court affords more protection under the First 
Amendment to the rights of newspapers as opposed to those of 
licensed broadcasters.109 In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 
the Supreme Court held that a Florida law that required newspapers 
to grant equal coverage to political candidates was an unlawful 
violation of the freedom of the press.U0 The Court explained that the 
First Amendment applies to newspapers because they are "more than 
a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and 
advertising. "111 The Court clarified its decision by explaining that 
"the choice of material to go into a newspaper ... constitute[s] the 
exercise of editorial control and judgment," and it "has yet to be 
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can 
be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free 
press as they have evolved to this time. "112 Although, as envisioned 
under the kill switch bill, the regulation of the Internet may impede 
the media's ability to disseminate information, Tornillo cannot be 
used to analyze the legality of the bill. Tornillo represents the First 
Amendment as it applies to print media and grants strong protection 
to the content of newspapers. 
As was the case with the Red Lion broadcasting example, the kill 
switch bill is distinguished from Tornillo. Tornillo concerns the right 
of the media to choose its subject matter in accordance with the law, 
whereas the bill would affect the general ability to disseminate 
information on the Internet. In essence, Tornillo focuses on what 
information can be communicated ipso facto while the appropriate 
discussion of the bill should focus on the ability to express the 
material through the Internet. As such, the analysis of this bill in 
conjunction with the freedom of expression enjoyed by the media is 
inappropriate. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In the modern technological era, cyberattacks continue to be a 
real and serious threat. The proposed kill switch bill attempts to bar 
Internet connectivity in response to certain anticipated national 
security threats. Considering the existing Executive powers under the 
109. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) 
(describing the rights afforded to newspapers under the First 
Amendment). 
110. Id. at 258 (reversing the Supreme Court of Florida, which held that the 
regulation was lawful). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
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1934 Communications Act in conjunction with congressional approval 
for the bill, this legislation is within the scope of the Executive's 
power. Additionally, the First Amendment's high threshold is 
unlikely to trigger action under the bill, which leads to the conclusion 
that evaluation under this amendment is unnecessary. 
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